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One goal of the public employment service is to facilitate matching between unemployed job 
seekers and job vacancies; another goal is to monitor job search so as to bring search efforts 
among the unemployed in line with search requirements. The referral of job seekers to 
vacancies is one instrument used for these purposes. We report results from a randomized 
Swedish experiment where the outcome of referrals is examined. To what extent do 
unemployed individuals actually apply for the jobs they are referred to? Does information to 
job seekers about increased monitoring affect the probability of applying and the probability 
of leaving unemployment? The experiment indicates that a relatively large fraction (one third) 
of the referrals do not result in job applications. Information about intensified monitoring 
causes an increase in the probability of job application, especially among young people. 
However, we find no significant impact on the duration of unemployment. 
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The referral of unemployed job seekers to job vacancies is key instrument whereby the 
public employment service (PES) attempts to facilitate the matching between job 
seekers and vacancies. This instrument is also used as a device to monitor job search, 
thereby reducing the moral hazard problems in unemployment insurance. A job seeker 
who fails to apply for a job that he is referred to runs a risk of being sanctioned, i.e., 
being exposed to a benefit withdrawal or a benefit reduction. However, a credible threat 
of a benefit sanction requires that PES gathers and uses information on whether referrals 
lead to actual job applications.  
 
Our study focuses on vacancy referrals in Sweden, a country well known for its ambitious 
active labor market policies. The vacancy referral process is a key ingredient of these 
policies. A vacancy referral involves a formal letter to the job seeker where a particular 
vacancy is identified. The letter states explicitly that the job seeker should apply for the 
vacancy and that failure to do so can result in a reduction or withdrawal of unemployment 
benefits. The annual flow of referrals via PES has amounted to some 13 – 18 percent 
relative to the labor force (AMS, 2007a). A referral should take place when the PES 
administrator has found a job that is “suitable” to the job seeker. The suitability criterion 
is a bit vague but attempts to prevent “excessive” search for jobs where the qualification 
requirements would rule out successful matches. The two goals of the referrals – 
matching and monitoring – may call for different priorities in the process: the more 
monitoring is emphasized, the less focus should be directed at referring the job seeker to 
suitable vacancies.  
 
We examine how the vacancy referral process works and focus on three main questions. 
Do referrals lead to actual job applications? Does a “threat” of increased monitoring 
affect the probability of searching for a job that a worker is referred to? And how does 
this threat affect the duration of unemployment? To answer these questions, we have 
undertaken a randomized experiment based on a sample of vacancy referrals during the 2 
 
fall of 2007. Surveys to employers were used to get information about how often referrals 
lead to job applications. Some unemployed job seekers – the “treatment groups” – were 
alerted (via letters from PES) to an increased risk of being monitored, i.e., an increased 
probability that their referral would be checked with the employer.  
 
We find that about one third of the referrals did not result in actual job applications. 
Information about increased monitoring resulted in a higher probability of job 
application. The average impact amounts to an increase in the job application rate by 4 
percentage points. The impact is most pronounced – 12 percentage points – among young 
people. However, there is no statistically significant impact on the duration of 
unemployment.  
 
We proceed by a brief overview of some related previous studies. Section 3 describes the 
experiment; section 4 discusses some theoretical issues; section 4 presents empirical 
results, and section 5 concludes. 
2 Previous  studies   
We are unaware of previous studies that focus on vacancy referrals in the matching 
process. However, there are a number of related studies that deal with the effects of job 
search requirements and job search assistance (see Fredriksson and Holmlund, 2006, for a 
survey). Arguably, the most convincing evidence is based on work search experiments 
undertaken in the United States. One experiment was undertaken in the state of 
Washington in 1986-87 and is described in Johnson and Kleppinger (1994). Four 
different treatments were considered: (i) elimination of work-search requirement; (ii) 
standard requirement; (iii) individualized requirements; and (iv) intensive services. 
Individuals in the first category had essentially no search requirements. They were not 
required to report a specific number of employer contacts and UI payments were made 
automatically to claimants until they reported change of circumstance, such as return to 
work. The second category had requirements similar to what had been practiced in most 
states. Claimants had to make at least three employer contacts per week and those 3 
 
employers had to be listed on bi-weekly continued claims forms. Individuals in the third 
category were subject to work-search treatments tailored to specific circumstances of 
their occupation or local labor market. The fourth category had job search assistance 
early in the unemployment spell.  
 
The study finds strong evidence that more stringent search requirements reduce the length 
of benefit receipt. Workers in the first category (no search requirements) had three weeks 
longer duration of benefit receipt than those with standard requirements. No search 
requirement also increased the risk of benefit exhaustion and increased the probability of 
being reemployed by the same employer. There is some evidence that workers in the first 
category had slightly higher reemployment wages in the short term, a finding consistent 
with higher reservation wages. However, there is no evidence of any longer-term effects 
on wages.  
 
Another experimental study was undertaken in Maryland in 1994 and is presented in 
Benus and Johnson (1997). Benefit claimants were randomly assigned to four treatment 
groups and two control groups. The control groups were required to follow the standard 
requirements at the time, including the report of at least two employer contacts per week 
(although without any verification of the contacts). Participants in one of the control 
groups were informed that they were part of an experimental study. The treatments were 
as follows: (i) increased work-search requirements by requiring workers to make at least 
four employer contacts per week; (ii) requiring two employer contacts per week but 
without any requirement of documentation; (iii) a requirement that workers should attend 
a four-day job search workshop early during the unemployment spell; and (iv) 
information to the claimants that their reported employer contacts would be verified. 
 
The results from the Maryland study suggest that increased search requirements can have 
non-trivial behavioral effects. Increasing the number of required employer contacts from 
two to four reduced the duration of benefit receipt by 6 percent. Informing claimants that 
their employer contacts would be verified reduced the duration of benefit receipt by 7.5 
percent. Participation in the job search workshop reduced the number of benefit weeks by 4 
 
5 percent, a finding broadly consistent with results from other experiments undertaken in 
the United States. The effect could reflect enhanced skills in job search but may also 
reflect higher perceived costs of remaining on UI (as the workshop reduces time available 
for leisure). In fact, the Maryland study suggests that the latter interpretation may be most 
plausible. The effect is largely driven by a sharp increase in exit rates from 
unemployment prior to the scheduled workshop.  
 
A study by Ashenfelter et al. (2005) also reports results from randomized experiments 
intended to measure whether stricter enforcement and verification of job search activities 
reduce UI claims. The experiments were implemented in four states – Connecticut, 
Massachusetts, Virginia and Tennessee – in 1984-85. The treatments included attempts to 
verify job search activities and also actual verifications (such as in depth interviews 
concerning the claimant’s search effort and in some cases contacts with employers).
 The 
study finds at most a very small effect on benefit payments.  
 
Dolton and O’Neill (1996) report evidence from the Restart experiments in the United 
Kingdom. Individuals with elapsed unemployment of six months were randomly assigned 
to participation in an interview to counsel them on active job search (the treatment 
group). Failure to attend the interview carried an explicit risk of losing benefits. The 
control group consisted of individuals that were not notified to attend an interview. The 
study reports that the notification of an interview had a statistically significant positive 
effect on exit rates to employment. The magnitude of the effect on the job exit rate is also 
substantial (around 30 percent). 
 
Van den Berg and van der Klaauw (2006) report results from a small experiment 
undertaken at two local employment offices in the Netherlands. They discuss the tradeoff 
between formal and informal search, where formal search takes place via public 
employment offices and informal search involves other channels, such as gathering 
information from friends. The treatments entailed counseling as well as monitoring, both 
presumably affecting formal search. The study cannot find any support for the claim that 
monitoring and counseling raises the transition rate from unemployment to employment. 5 
 
The interpretation favored by the authors is that monitoring of formal search induced a 
substitution away from informal search channels. 
 
Recent work by Hägglund (2006) presents some Swedish randomized experiments that 
shed light on search requirements and search assistance in active labor market policy. 
Hägglund (2006) describes one of those experiments, where a randomly selected 
treatment group of job seekers was exposed to intensified monitoring and job search 
assistance. The combined effects of the two treatments were to substantially increase the 
rate of outflow from unemployment. The control of search intensity had no independent 
effect. 
 
Some recent Swedish non-experimental studies have in part dealt with the role of vacancy 
referrals; see IAF (2006) and Riksrevisionen (2005). Both these studies conclude that 
referrals are rarely followed up. In 2005, the Swedish PES introduced new rules so as to 
increase the follow-up of vacancy referrals. Among other things, these rules involved 
random checks with employers to verify job applications. However, these rules have not 
been comprehensively implemented. A study by PES (AMS, 2007a) reveals that 15 
percent of referred seekers had not sent in a job application (according to the employers) 
despite the fact that they stated that they had done so.  
 
3  Design and implementation of the study 
The practical implementation of the experiment was done by the Public Employment 
Service. The referrals in the study were randomly selected during a 9-week period in 
August and September 2007. A number of criteria had to be fulfilled in order to be 
included in the treatment groups: (i) An employer could appear at most once among the 
referrals (so as minimize the employer’s cost of participating). (ii) A job seeker could 
appear at most once in any of the treatment groups. (iii) Included referrals had a deadline 6 
 
for job application within (roughly) three weeks.
1 (iv) Only referrals pertaining to 
individuals qualified for unemployment benefits (UB) were considered since a non-
recipient faces no risk of benefit sanction.  
 
The sampling was made sequentially. Starting from the flow of all new referrals (about 
10-15,000 each week) we apply conditions (iii) and (iv) above; this reduced the number 
of referrals to about 2-3,000. This group constitutes the population (P) of referrals in the 
study. In the next step all employers and individuals that had been drawn prior weeks 
were removed from the population. In the final steps conditions (i) and (ii) were applied 
to the remaining population: first random exclusion of all but one of the referrals 
pertaining to the same employer, then random exclusion of all but one of the referrals 
pertaining to the same individual. The population thus consists of all referrals that had 
an a priori chance of selection.  
 
With these criteria applied, some 500 referrals were included each week. Individuals 
were randomly allocated to three treatment groups denoted A, B and C. Group A was 
subject to increased monitoring via surveys to employers so as to verify job applications 
associated with referrals. In addition, the members of this group were informed by letter 
that a referral to a job opening would most likely be followed up through employer 
contacts. See Appendix A for a description of the information letter. People in group B 
were also subject to increased monitoring via surveys to employers but no “advance 
warning” was given to them. Group C received the same information letter as group A, 
but no employer contacts took place. Group D is defined as the remaining population of 
referrals after group A, B and C have been removed, i.e. D=P-(A+B+C).  
 
The selection of referrals into the three groups was made each Friday between August 3 
and September 28 (9 occasions in total). The letters to the job seekers were sent out as 
soon as the selection was made. The letters were expected to arrive approximately 
within a week after the individual had been given the referral. 
                                                 




The survey to employers for group A and B was sent out shortly after the “last 
publication day” of the vacancy, which generally coincides with the last day for 
application. The timing was chosen so that the survey should arrive when the employer 
was actively handling the applications. The purpose was to reduce the effort of answering 
the survey and thereby increase the response rate. If the employer failed to answer the 
survey within a given time period, a reminder letter was sent out. 
 
In addition to the question about whether a person referred to a vacancy actually applied 
for the job, questions were also asked about whether an applicant had the necessary 
qualifications (“realistic” application), if she was offered the job and if she accepted or 
turned down the job.
2 The employer was also asked to report his subjective impression of 
whether or not the applicant appeared seriously interested in the job. See Appendix B. 
 
Table 1 shows how different samples are used in our analyses. When exploiting the 
employer survey we compare group A (treatment) with group B (control), conditional on 
receipt of unemployment benefits (UB) at some point between the date of the referral and 
the vacancy’s last day of publication. Receipt of UB includes individuals who receive 
compensation associated with participation in labor market programs. We observe from 
Table 1 that the response rates among groups A and B are virtually identical.  
 
In the analysis of unemployment duration we also use sample C; this group received the 
information letter but were not included in the employer survey. Unemployment 
duration is defined in terms of weeks of benefit receipt subsequent to the referral week. 
The treatment set consists of groups A and C and the control is group B. The analysis is 
conditioned on positive benefit receipt during the week when the referral was made.  
 
                                                                                                                                               
criterion typically coincides with the deadline for job application.  
2 Responses regarding job offers and job acceptances are not used since we have found that some employers 
interpreted these questions differently than others. 8 
 
Table 2 shows some descriptive statistics. The differences in means are negligible and 
statistically insignificant across the three groups A, B and C. A comparison with group 
D reveals that there are fewer men in D as well as more prior referrals.  
 
Table 1. Samples and response rates. 
Sample Sample  usage  A  B  C  D 
          
Overall sample  Descriptive statistics  1504  1485  1506  22895 
          
Responses Never  used  948  947     
          
Response rate    0.63  0.64     
          
Response and some UB 
between referral and last day 
of publication 
Survey analysis   782  799     
          
Overall sample and some UB 
during referral week  Duration analysis  1148  1138  1118   
          
 
 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics for samples (A, B and C) and population (D). 
Variable A  B  C  D 
Male 0.48  0.50  0.51  0.43 
Age (years)  40.5  40.5  40.2  40.1 
Less than high school  0.21  0.22  0.21  0.19 
High school  0.48  0.47  0.49  0.48 
Some university education  0.31  0.32  0.30  0.33 
Number of prior referrals 2006 and 2007  4.18  4.02  4.33  5.22 
Elapsed duration of UB receipt (days)  129  128  130  136 
UB during referral period  0.82  0.84  0.82  0.85 
N 1504  1485  1506  22895 
Notes: The variables are dummies unless otherwise stated. “UB during referral period” is a dummy for some 
UB receipt between the date of the referral and the last publication date of the vacancy. 
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4 Theoretical  issues 
We are interested in how intensified monitoring affects job applications and job 
findings. A positive impact on application rates is plausible, but it is not clear that this 
will translate into a positive impact on job findings. First, some applications are unlikely 
to meet the qualification requirements for the jobs; indeed, our survey indicates that 
only some 60 percent the applications were deemed “realistic” by the employers (see 
Table 3 below). Second, a higher propensity to adhere to formal search rules may come 
at the expense of informal search as discussed by van den Berg and van der Klaauw 
(2006). A worker who is induced to spend more time applying for referred vacancies 
may find less time to search via other channels, such as direct employer contacts. The 
link between job application and job finding is thus not immediate. In general, we 
expect that the impact on job finding should be weaker than the impact on application.  
 
The impact of intensified monitoring on formal and informal search can be illustrated 
by means of a simple partial equilibrium model.
3 Consider an unemployed worker who 
has access to two search channels, viz. formal and informal search. Informal search is 
not effectively monitored so there is no risk of a benefit sanction as a result of limited 
search effort. Formal search takes place via vacancy referrals undertaken by PES and 
the worker runs a risk of losing benefits if she fails to apply to a referred job. Let  i s  
denote search effort along the formal (i=1) and informal channel (i=2), respectively. Job 
offers via the informal channel arrive at the Poisson rate  2 s  , where   is a measure of 
(exogenous) labor market conditions.  
 
Vacancy referrals arrive at the Poisson rate   and may result in a transition to work or 
a benefit sanction. Let  1 s    denote the probability per unit time of a job transition, 
                                                 
3 The model has similarities with the model in van den Berg and van der Klaauw (2006) but there are also 
differences. The job acceptance decision is trivial in our model since the wage offer distribution is degenerate by 
assumption. Our model focuses on vacancy referrals and the risk of a benefit sanction if search effort is deemed 
insufficient.  10 
 
where   is a measure of labor market conditions.
4 The analogous probability of being 
exposed to a benefit sanction is  , where  1 (;) s     depends on search effort along 
the formal margin and the intensity of monitoring,  . Holding monitoring constant, an 
increase in formal search should reduce the risk of being sanctioned. Holding formal 
search effort constant, an increase in monitoring should increase the sanction probability 
since more non-compliance is detected. We thus assume  1 0    and  2 0   . We also 
assume  12 0    which implies that a higher intensity of monitoring should increase the 
marginal return to search in terms of an increased probability of not being sanctioned. 
 
Let r denote the discount rate, E the expected present value of employment, U the value 
of unemployment and S the value of a sanction. There is no wage dispersion so workers 
always accept job offers. Assuming an infinite time horizon, we can write the value 
function as: 
 
(1)  12 1 1 2 (, ) ( ) (;) ( ) ( ) rU b c s s s E U s S U s E U              
 
where b is unemployment benefits and  12 (, ) cs s is the search cost function. For 
simplicity, we normalize the value of a sanction to zero. The search cost function is 
increasing and strictly convex in each argument. In addition, an arguably plausible 
property is  12 0 c  . Van den Berg and van der Klaauw (2006) make this assumption 
arguing that “the efforts along the two channels are relatively similar activities 
compared to most other ways to spend time and money.” 
 
The first-order conditions for an interior solution are: 
 
(2)    11 1 :( ) 0 sc E U U        
(3)  22 :( ) 0 scE U      
                                                 
4 A natural benchmark is    , but this equality need not hold if informal and formal search cover different 
segments of the labor market. In any case, this is irrelevant for the results. 11 
 
 
The first terms in (2) and (3) capture the marginal costs of search. The second terms 
capture the marginal returns to search along the formal and informal channels. Note that 
the marginal return to formal search involves terms associated with the gain from job 
finding,  () EU   , as well as the reduced risk of benefit sanction,  1 0 U    . Assume 
for simplicity that employment is an absorbing state and treat E as constant. The value 
of unemployment depends on the intensity of monitoring; a rise in   reduces the value 
of unemployment.
5 It is thus clear that intensified monitoring affects the marginal return 
to formal search (via  11 (;) s   and  () U  ) as well as the marginal return to informal 
search (via  ( ) U  ). Assuming that the second-order conditions are satisfied, 




12 22 1 22 12
sU U
sign sign Uc c c     
 




11 12 12 1 12
sU U
sign sign c Uc c     
 
          
 
 
where  11 22 12 0, 0, 0 cc  ,  /0 U     and (probably)  12 0 c  . The signs of these 
expressions are ambiguous in general but the mechanisms are intuitive. The first term in 
the bracket of (4) is positive and captures that the marginal return to formal search 
increases via stronger incentives to avoid a sanction since  12 0   . The second term in 
the bracket of (4) incorporates the impact via the value of unemployment; the term 
cannot be signed since  1     can take either sign. The third term in (4) is negative and 
captures interactions between formal and informal search via the search cost function: 
an increase in informal search increases the marginal cost of formal search (and vice 
versa) if formal and informal search are “relatively similar activities” in the sense that 
12 0 c  .  
                                                 
5 Use (1) to obtain      12 1 2 () / () Ub c s E s Ers s               , where  /0 U    since  2 0   . 12 
 
 
The impact of monitoring on informal search works via the value of unemployment and 
thereby the marginal return to search,  () E U   . The first term in (5) is positive since 
/0 U     and thus  () /0 EU     . Intensified monitoring would thus tend to 
increase informal search. However, this effect is counteracted by the second and 
possibly the third term. The second term is negative as long as  12 0 c  .  
 
Summing up, it is not clear how intensified monitoring of vacancy referrals will affect 
formal and informal search. The overall impact on job finding, which depends on both 
types of search activities, is ambiguous. The properties of the search cost and 
monitoring technologies are crucial for the outcomes. Empirical evidence on these 
properties is, unfortunately, close to nonexistent.  
 
5 Empirical  results 
5.1 The  survey 
Some basic results from the employer survey are reported in Table 3. Over 30 percent of 
referrals did not result in job applications. This number may perhaps appear to be on the 
high side but the lack of previous studies cautions against strong priors about what is 
reasonable or not. There is a presumption that the reliability should be higher for 
positions in the public sector since those employers are required to keep records on job 
applications. However, when we look separately on jobs that most likely pertain to the 
public sector, we find roughly the same rate of non-compliance. Moreover, a small 
survey to employers undertaken by PES during 2008 found that about 25 percent of the 
referrals did not result in job applications. 
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Table 3. The survey results. 
Question Group  Yes  No  Unknown or 
uncertain  N 
          
 A  0.68  0.32    782 
Applied for 
the job  B 0.64  0.36   799 
  t (A-B)  1.65       
          
 A  0.65  0.10  0.25  530 
Interested in 
the job  B 0.64  0.08  0.28  510 
  t (A-B)  0.46  1.00  -1.14   
          
 A  0.59  0.16  0.25  530 
Realistic 
application  B 0.58  0.15  0.27  510 
  t (A-B)  0.15  0.42  -0.51   
Notes: The t-statistics test for equality of the means.  
 
 
5.2  The impact of information on search behavior  
We now turn to a more detailed analysis of how the “threat” of a referral follow-up 
influences the probability of job application. We expect that those exposed to 
information about a probable follow-up would be more prone to obey the rules and 
apply for the job (although the theory is somewhat ambiguous about the direction of the 
effect). 
By and large, this presumption is confirmed by the data; see Table 4. The application 
rate is 4 percentage points higher in treatment group A than in the B control. However, 
the difference is only marginally significant. The estimate and the standard errors are 
unaffected by the inclusion of control variables in the second column.  
 
The three last columns of the table include results from alternative specifications. We 
consider interactions between treatment status and three indicators of labor market 
experience, namely the number of previous referrals, elapsed duration of 
unemployment, and age. The broad pattern that emerges is that labor market 
“inexperience” is associated with stronger responsiveness to the information treatment. 14 
 
In particular, those who are young or have short previous unemployment spells appear 
highly responsive; the estimates imply an impact on the application rate of 11 or 12 
percentage points. We have also examined if the treatment effects vary by gender and 
education (not shown in Table 5). We find a significant effect for men (7 percentage 
points) but not for women. There is some evidence the effect is higher for individuals 
with relatively low education although the differences are only marginally significant.
6  
 
An intriguing question is why those with relatively little labor market experience appear 
to be the most responsive. We speculate that the results may reflect differential 
assessments of the information letter’s implicit threat of benefit sanction. The 
“objective” risk of benefit sanction has been very low in Sweden: on average around 
0.45 sanctions per month out of 100 benefit recipients took place in 2005, 2006 and 
2007.
7 Older individuals and those with experiences of long spells of unemployment 
have presumably learned that the risk of benefit sanction is very low, despite strict 
formal rules, and adjusted their behavior accordingly. For these groups, a reminder of 
the rules may not have much impact on the perceived sanction probability. However, 
those who have recently been introduced to the UI rules, including the rules that apply 




5.3  The impact of information on unemployment duration 
As discussed above, it is not obvious that a positive impact of monitoring on job 
application will also imply a positive impact on job finding. Some applications are 
                                                 
6 The impacts of the “other controls” (not shown) are as follows: The application probability is higher for 
women than for men, increases with age and education, but have no statistically significant relationship 
with the length of previous unemployment and the number of previous referrals. 
7 See AMS (2007b), p. 79. A sanction is implemented in two steps. First, a notification is sent from PES 
to the unemployment insurance fund. Second, a decision on sanction, given notification, is taken by an 
insurance fund. The estimate of 0.45 is obtained by multiplying the average notification rate (0.54) by the 
average (conditional) sanction rate (0.85).  
8 “If you receive unemployment benefits you are required to apply for referred jobs according to the rules regarding 
unemployment insurance.” See Appendix A. 15 
 
unlikely to meet the qualification requirements for the jobs. We have also noted that 
intensified monitoring of formal search may reduce workers’ informal search.  
 
We examine how the information treatment has affected subsequent UB receipt rather 
than job finding; the UB data are arguably of higher quality than the data on job finding. 
The data on UB receipt include benefit information on a daily basis. A transition out of 
unemployment is defined as non-receipt of UB during a whole week; the results are 
insensitive to alternative definitions, such as non-receipt during two weeks.  
 
The treatment we are interested in is unlikely to have a permanent impact on job 
finding. The information letter specified explicitly the time frame of the referral 
experiment (August 15 to October 15, 2007). Referrals outside this period should thus 
not be subject to intensified follow-ups. However, it is conceivable that these dates are 
not well recalled at later dates. To the extent that individuals perceive a general increase 
in the likelihood of being exposed to a follow-up, the information letter may well have 
more long term effects on job finding. Ultimately, this is an empirical question.  16 
 
Table 4. Estimates of treatment effects. Dependent variable: Did the individual apply for 
the job? (Yes=1, No=0). 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Intercept  0.638 
(0.017)        
          
Treatment (A)  0.039* 
(0.024) 
0.040* 
(0.024)      
          
A and few previous 
referrals      0.059* 
(0.035)    
          
A and some previous 
referrals     0.049 
(0.047)    
          
A and many previous 





          
A and short 
unemployment history       0.105*** 
(0.033)   
          
A and intermediate 
unemployment history       -0.064 
(0.047)   
          
A and long 
unemployment history       0.010 
(0.049)   
          
A and age ≤ 30          0.119** 
(0.051) 
          
A and age >30          0.018 
(0.027) 
          
Other controls  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
R2  (%)  0.17 1.53  1.86 2.18  1.73 
N  1581 1581  1581 1581  1581 
Notes: The estimation is by OLS. Standard errors are in the parentheses. Significance: *=10%; **=5%; ***=1%. 
Previous referrals (during 2006 and 2007): few (0, 1); some (2, 3, 4); many (5 or more). Unemployment history 
is measured as days of UB receipt. Short history (< 100 days); intermediate (100 – 250); long (>250 days). The 
standard set of “other controls” include age, gender, level of education, number of previous referrals, and days of 
UB receipt. In the models with interactions we also include controls for the baseline effects of the variables that 
are interacted with the treatment dummy.  17 
 
 
We have studied the impact on unemployment duration through several approaches. 
First, we ran Cox regressions to explain exits from unemployment during a period that 
ends in week 14, 2008. At that date, only 16 percent of the spells were right-censored. 
Second, we ran a number of OLS regressions explaining the probability of remaining on 
UB after x weeks after the referral, where x is 4, 8 and 12. That is, we focus on the labor 
market state relatively close to the referral period on the assumption that the information 
letter should have the strongest impact close to this period. For both of these 
approaches, we allowed for interaction terms along the lines of those in Table 4.  
 
The results from the Cox regressions are shown in Table 5, whereas the results from the 
OLS regressions are shown in Appendix C. We do not find any significant treatment 
effects in any of these specifications. Thus, there is no evidence that advance warning 
about intensified follow-ups of referrals has any positive (or negative) impact on 
unemployment duration. The precise reasons for this result are unclear but we have 
emphasized that an impact on job application need not automatically imply an impact 
on job finding. The result may reflect a substitution of away from informal towards 
formal search. However, absent data on search this can be no more than a speculation.  
 18 
 
Table 5. COX regressions of unemployment duration.  
   (1)  (2)  (2)  (4)  (5) 
Treatment (A)  0.011 
(0.040) 
0.007 
(0.040)      
          
A and few previous 
referrals     0.024 
(0.060)    
          
A and some previous 
referrals     0.024 
(0.077)    
          
A and many previous 
referrals     -0.032 
(0.073)    
          
A and short 
unemployment history      -0.042 
(0.057)   
          
A and medium 
unemployment history       0.048 
(0.079)   
          
A and long 
unemployment history       0.078 
(0.077)   
          
A and age≤30         -0.027 
(0.077) 
          
A and age>30          0.022 
(0.046) 
Other controls  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
N 3404  3404  3404  3404  3404 
Notes: Unemployment duration is measured as weeks of UB receipt subsequent to the referral week. 
Standard errors are in the parentheses. See notes to Table 4 for details about the variables. The duration 
data are censored at week 14, 2008, where 16 percent of the spells are right-censored. 
 
 
6 Concluding  remarks 
We have presented results from a randomized labor market experiment where job search 
among the unemployed are subject to intensified monitoring. The treatment involves 
information that PES will most likely contact the employer in order to verify job 
applications associated with vacancy referrals. We find that the threat of referral follow-
ups causes an increase in job application rates, especially among young people. However, 
we find no impact on unemployment duration. 19 
 
 
The possibility that intensified monitoring of formal search may have little impact on 
total search raises some doubts about the efficacy of such policies. However, there is so 
far rather limited evidence on the empirical relevance of this possibility. If similar 
experiments are undertaken in the future, it would be valuable to incorporate collection of 
more comprehensive data of job search activities.  
 
Our study has focused on how the threat of benefit sanction affects search effort. 
Monitoring of job search can also affect workers’ reservation wages and thereby their 
propensity to accept job offers. A complete analysis of monitoring and work-search 
requirements must consider the impact on job acceptance decisions along with the 
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Appendix A. The letter to groups A and C 
 
Monitoring of job referrals 
 
You have been selected for a specific follow up of job referrals. The follow up pertains 
to referrals between August 15 and October 15 2007. If you are referred to a vacancy 
during this period, the Public Employment Service will with high probability contact the 
employer regarding your application.  
 
The fact that you have been selected has nothing to do with earlier referrals that you 
might have received. The selection was random and covered the whole country. 
 
The purpose is to study the Public Employment Service’s referrals to vacancies. The 
result of the study will be processed and handled confidentially.  
 
If you receive unemployment benefits you are required to apply for referred jobs 
according to the rules regarding unemployment insurance.  
 
Questions may be sent to anvisningsstudie@ams.amv.se 
Or call the Public Employment Service’s customer service, 010 – 487 24 76.  
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Appendix B. The survey to employers 
 
 
1. Did the job seeker apply for the referred job? 
  Yes  
  No >>>>> exit survey  
   
2. Did you get the impression that the applicant was seriously interested in the job? 
  Yes  
  No 
  Uncertain  
  Do not know, lack of information 
  Comment:………………………….  
   
3. Was the referral realistic in the sense that the applicant met the formal/informal 
qualifications?  
  Yes  
  No  
  Uncertain  
  Do not know, lack of information 
  Comment:……………………………  
   
4. Did the applicant get the job?  
  Yes  
  No  
  Vacancy not yet filled 
  Comment:……………………………  
   
5. If the answer on the fourth question was “No”: Why didn’t the applicant get the job?  
  He/she turned down the job 
  It was offered to another applicant 
  Comment:……………………………………  23 
 
Appendix C. Further results on unemployment 
duration 
 
Table C1. OLS regression explaining the probability of UB receipt 4 weeks 
after referral 
  (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Intercept  0.772  
(0.012)      
Treatment (A)  0.000  
(0.015) 
0.000 
(0.015)     
        
A and few previous 
referrals     0.028 
(0.023)    
A and some previous 
referrals     -0.040 
(0.029)    
A and many previous 
referrals     -0.005 
(0.028)    
        
A and short 
unemployment history       0.020 
(0.021)   
A and medium 
unemployment history       -0.020 
(0.030)   
A and long 
unemployment history       -0.014 
(0.029)   
        
A and age≤30         0.000 
(0.031) 
A and age>30          0.000  
0.017) 
Other controls  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
N 3404  3404  3404  3404  3404 





Table C2. OLS regression explaining the probability of UB receipt 8 weeks 
after referral 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Intercept  0.686 
(0.014)        
Treatment (A)  -0.011 
(0.017) 
-0.010 
(0.017)     
          
A and few previous 
referrals     -0.004 
(0.025)    
A and some previous 
referrals     -0.035 
(0.033)    
A and many previous 
referrals     0.002 
(0.031)    
          
A and short 
unemployment history      -0.001 
(0.024)   
A and intermediate 
unemployment history      -0.016 
(0.034)   
A and long 
unemployment history      -0.024 
(0.033)   
          
A and age≤30         -0.032 
(0.035) 
A and age>30          -0.004 
(0.019) 
Other  controls  No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N  3404 3404 3404 3404 3404 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. See also Table 4. 25 
 
 
Table C3. OLS regression explaining the probability of UB receipt 12 weeks 
after referral. 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Intercept  0.590 
(0.015)      
Treatment (A)  0.003 
(0.018) 
0.003 
(0.018)     
       
A and few previous  
referrals     0.006 
(0.027)    
A and some previous 
referrals     0.008 
(0.034)    
A and many previous  
referrals     -0.007 
(0.033)    
       
A and short  
unemployment history      0.010 
(0.025)   
A and intermediate  
unemployment history      -0.009 
(0.035)   
A and long  
unemployment history      -0.005 
(0.034)   
       
A and age≤30       0.010 
(0.036) 
A and age>30          0.000 
(0.020) 
Other  controls  No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N  3404 3404 3404 3404 3404 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. See also Table 4. 
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